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INTRODUCTION

A. The National Trend to Limit Lender Liability
During the 1980s, the number of lender liability lawsuits grew
dramatically.1 Experts have blamed this increase in litigation on two

factors. 2 First, bank deregulation augmented the competition between

lenders, which caused banks to create new methods of financing.3

*EditorsNote: This note received the Gertrude Brick Law Review Apprentice Prize for the
best student note submitted in the Fall 1992 semester.
**Dedicated to the memory of my grandfathers, David Schwartz and Leon Tochner. I would
also like to thank my note advisor, Jonathan Gerber, for his helpful comments and advice.
1. Jerry M. Gewirtz, Impact of FloridaStatute § 687.0304 on Lender Liability Actions,
FLA. B.J., June 1992, at 82.

2.

Id.

3. Id.; H.R.

OF FLORIDA, COMM. ON COMMERCE, FINAL STAFF ANALYSIS AND
ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT ON H.B. 878, at 1 (1989) (hereinafter HOUsE IMPACT STATEMENT].
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Second, the courts constructed new theories of lender liability which
soon gained wide acceptance. 4 The combination of creative financing
and creative theories of lender liability resulted in many large judgments against lenders.- These large judgments significantly increased
the cost of lending money6 and even threatened the solvency of some
banks. 7 The banks, in turn, passed these costs on to borrowers and
depositors.8 Many state legislatures found it necessary to respond to
this situation.9 In order to keep lending costs down, 1° to provide stability in the financial markets,11 or perhaps just to appease the banking
lobby, 12 most state legislatures have enacted particularized statutes
1
of frauds which limit lender liability. 3
The enactment of these statutes of frauds has made it more difficult
for borrowers' counsel to successfully allege creative new lender liability causes of action because the statutes limit borrowers' claims to
those derived from written credit agreements. 14 During the 1980s, a
typical lender liability complaint alleged many different causes of action. 15 Borrowers alleged breach of contract claims, as well as tort

4. HOUSE IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 3, at 1; Gewirtz, supra note 1, at 82. The
courts have accepted these new theories because of their changing policy toward the creditorborrower relationship. Kendall Coffey, The Expansion of Lender Liability in Florida,40 FLA.
L. REV. 85, 103 (1988). Originally, courts viewed creditors and borrowers as dealing at arms'
length. Id. In the 1980s, courts increasingly imposed a duty on creditors to exercise reasonable
care for the protection of the borrower. Id.
5. See Coffey, supra note 4, at 85; see also John L. Culhane, Jr. & Dean C. Gramlich,
Lender Liability LimitationAmendments to State Statutes of Frauds, 45 Bus. LAw. 1779, 1779
n.2 and accompanying text, 1785 nn.36-38 and accompanying text (1990) (noting the "monumental"
judgments awarded to borrower plaintiffs for successful claims based on breach of an oral credit
agreement).
6. Todd C. Pearson, Note, Limiting Lender Liability: The Trend Toward Written Credit
Agreement Statutes, 76 MINN. L. REV. 295, 301 (1991).
7. See Culhane & Gramlich, supra note 5, at 1785; Pearson, supra note 6, at 302 n.22.
8. Pearson, supra note 6, at 301-02.
9. See id. at 296-97.
10. See id. at 301-02.
11. See HOUSE IMPACT STATEMENT, supranote 3, at 2; Pearson, supranote 6, at 301-02.
12. See Pearson, supra note 6, at 302.
13. See id. at 296 n.10 and accompanying text.
14. See Griffiths v. Barnett Bank, 603 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992) (holding that FLA.
STAT. § 687.0304 prevents a borrower from maintaining an action on a credit agreement even
if the borrower alleges negligence, breach of contract, indemnification, breach of fiduciary relationship, and fraud); Brenowitz v. Central Nat'l Bank, 597 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)
(implying that a debtor may not maintain an action on an oral credit agreement by using
traditional defenses to a statute of frauds, such as waiver, estoppel, and bad faith).
15. Culhane & Gramlich, supra note 5, at 1779.
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theories and statute-based claims. 16 In addition, borrowers frequently
alleged that the lender breached an oral agreement.' Such allegations
commonly included breach of an oral commitment to lend, breach of
an oral agreement to refinance an existing loan, and breach of an oral
agreement to forbear from enforcing contractual remedies. 8 By requiring that credit agreements be in writing for a debtor to sue a lender,
these particularized statutes of frauds prevent debtors from making
any claims based on oral agreements. 9 In addition, these statutes may
also bar tort claims, because torts are not based on written credit
agreements. 20
B. Florida'sEffort to Limit Lender Liability
In 1989, the State of Florida joined the movement to limit lender
liability when it enacted Florida Statutes section 687.0304.21 The
16. Id. Tort theories included fraud, intentional interference, negligence, and breach of
fiduciary duty. Coffey, supra note 4, at 99-113.
17. Culhane & Gramlich, supra note 5, at 1779.
18. Id.
19. See Pearson, supra note 6, at 302.
20. See Grzffib, 603 So. 2d at 690 (holding that FLA. STAT. § 687.0304 bars negligence
claims as well as fraud claims). However, if the tort claim is entirely independent of the breach
of contract claim, then the debtor may be able to sue on it. See Culhane & Gramlich, supra
note 5, at 1784.
21. FLA. STAT. § 687.0304 (1991). The statute provides:
(1) DEFINITIONS. - For the purposes of this section:
(a) "Credit agreement" means an agreement to lend or forbear repayment
of money, goods, or things in action, to otherwise extend credit, or to make
any other financial accommodation.
(b) "Creditor" means a person who extends credit under a credit agreement
with a debtor.
(c) 'Debtor" means a person who obtains credit or seeks a credit agreement
with a creditor or who owes money to a creditor.
(2) CREDIT AGREEMENTS TO BE IN WRITING. - A debtor may
not maintain an action on a credit agreement unless the agreement is in writing,
expresses consideration, sets forth the relevant terms and conditions, and is
signed by the creditor and the debtor.
(3) ACTIONS NOT CONSIDERED AGREEMENTS. (a) The following actions do not give rise to a claim that a new credit
agreement is created, unless the agreement satisfies the requirements of subsection (2):
1. The rendering of financial advice by a creditor to a debtor;,
2. The consultation by a creditor with a debtor; or
3. The agreement by a creditor to take certain actions, such as entering
into a new credit agreement, forbearing from exercising remedies under prior
credit agreements, or extending installments due under prior credit agreements.
() A credit agreement may not be implied from the relationship, fiduciary,
or otherwise, of the creditor and the debtor.
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Florida Legislature modeled this statute of frauds after Minnesota
Statutes section 513.33.2 The Florida statute is nearly identical to its
Minnesota counterpart.2 Because few Florida courts have interpreted
Florida Statutes section 687.0304, it is unclear how the statute will

22.

supra note 3, at 4; FLORIDA SENATE STAFF ANALYSIS
S.B. 830, at 2 (1989) [hereinafter SENATE IMPACT
STATEMENT]. It is unclear why the Florida Legislature picked MINN. STAT. § 513.33. The
Florida Legislature may have modeled FLA. STAT. § 687.0304 on the Minnesota statute because
Minnesota's statute was one of the first of its kind in the country, and nearly all the cases
construing such a statute of frauds were Minnesota cases. Pearson, supra note 6, at 307. Other
states also have patterned similar statutes after MINN. STAT. § 513.33. See, e.g., LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 6:1121-:1123 (West Supp. 1993).
HOUSE IMPACT STATEMENT,

AND ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT ON

23. Compare FLA. STAT. § 687.0304 (1991) with MINN. STAT. ANN. § 513.33 (West 1990).
The Minnesota statute provides:
513.33 CREDIT AGREEMENTS
SUBDIVISION 1. DEFINITIONS. For the purpose of this section, the following terms have the meanings given them:
(1) "credit agreement" means an agreement to lend or forbear repayment
of money, goods, or things in action, to otherwise extend credit, or to make any
other financial accommodation;
(2) "creditor" means a person who extends credit under a credit agreement
with a debtor;
(3) "debtor" means a person who obtains credit or seeks a credit agreement
with a creditor who owes money to a creditor; and
(4) "signed" has the meaning specified in section 336.1-201(39).
SUBD. 2. CREDIT AGREEMENTS TO BE IN WRITING. A debtor may not
maintain an action on a credit agreement unless the agreement is in writing,
expresses consideration, sets forth the relevant terms and conditions, and is signed
by the creditor and the debtor.
SUBD. 3. ACTIONS NOT CONSIDERED AGREEMENTS.
(a) The following actions do not give rise to a claim that a new credit
agreement is created, unless the agreement satisfies the requirements of subdivision
2:
(1) the rendering of financial advice by a creditor to a debtor;
(2) the consultation by a creditor with a debtor; or
(3) the agreement by a creditor to take certain actions, such as entering
into a new credit agreement, forbearing from exercising remedies under prior
credit agreements, or extending installments due under prior credit agreements.
(b) A credit agreement may not be implied from the relationship, fiduciary,
or otherwise, of the creditor and the debtor.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 513.33 (West 1990 & Supp. 1993). Apparently, the only difference between
the Florida statute and the Minnesota statute is that MINN. STAT. § 513.33, subdivision 1(4)
provides that the U.C.C. definition of "signed" applies to the statute. MINN. STAT. ANN. §
513.33, subd. 1(4) (West Supp. 1993). The Minnesota legislature amended MINN. STAT. § 513.33
in 1991 to include the U.C.C. definition for "signed." Rural Am. Bank v. Herickhoff, 485 N.W.2d
702, 706 (Minn. 1992). Florida has not similarly amended FLA. STAT. § 687.0304. See FLA.
STAT. § 687.0304 (1991).
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affect lender liability.Y However, because the Florida statute is based
on Minnesota Statutes section 513.33, Minnesota case law will probably
indicate how Florida courts will interpret the Florida statute.2 Thus,
in determining the effect of Florida Statutes section 687.0304 on lender
liability, this note examines both Minnesota and Florida case law.
Part II of this note examines the problems which this new statute
of frauds is intended to solve. Part III of this note discusses the
Minnesota and Florida case law and determines the probable effect

this statute will have on lender liability in Florida. Part IV discusses
the problems with Florida Statutes section 687.0304, and Part V pro-

poses solutions to those problems. By comparing Florida's method of
stemming lender liability with other states' methods, this note offers
alternatives to the Florida approach.

II.

THE PURPOSE OF FLORIDA STATUTES SECTION

687.0304

The Florida Legislature passed section 687.0304 to combat the
effects of increased lender liability litigation in Florida.26 Florida recognized that bank deregulation had resulted in increased competitiveness between banks.Y In response to the increased competition, len-

24. Six reported Florida cases have cited § 687.0304. See Griffiths v. Barnett Bank, 603
So. 2d 690 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); Brenowitz v. Central Nat'l Bank, 597 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 2d DCA
1992); SunFlower Bazaar, Inc. v. Florida First Int'l Bank, 610 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992);
Rivers v. Southeast Bank Leasing Co., 603 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Vans R Us, Inc.
v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 597 So. 2d 929 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Bob Young, Inc. v. Southeast
Bank, 583 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). However, only two of these cases interpret the
statute in depth. See Griffiths, 603 So. 2d at 690; Brenowitz, 597 So. 2d at 340.
25. The Minnesota Legislature enacted MINN. STAT. § 513.33 in 1985. MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 513.33 (West 1990). Since then, a number of Minnesota cases have analyzed the Minnesota
statute. See Pearson, supra note 6, at 309-16. Because the Florida statute is based on MINN.
STAT. § 513.33, Florida courts will look to Minnesota cases in order to interpret the Florida
statute. See, e.g., Brenowitz, 597 So. 2d at 342.
26.

HOUSE IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 3, at 1-2; SENATE IMPACT STATEMENT,

supra note 22, at 1.
27.

HOUSE IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 3, at 1-2. Banks were deregulated, in part,

because many non-bank institutions, such as investment bankers, insurance companies, and
retail creditors were providing a wide array of financial services. Joseph J. Norton, The 1982
Banking Act and the DeregulationScheme, 38 Bus. LAW. 1627 (1983). Deregulation eliminated
the statutory and regulatory barriers which divided commercial banks and thrift institutions,
such as federal savings and loans and federal savings banks, and put commercial banks in direct
competition with the thrift institutions and the non-bank institutions. Id. at 1627, 1633. Thus,
bank deregulation increased the competitiveness between banks and other financial institutions,
and also between the banks themselves. See id.
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ders created new methods of financing.2 The increased competition
and the new methods of financing encouraged litigation between borrowers and lenders.2 At the same time, borrowers' counsel created
new theories of lender liability.30 Not only did borrowers allege traditional breach of contract claims, but they also frequently alleged that
the lender breached oral agreements, such as oral commitments to
lend, oral agreements to refinance loans, and oral agreements to forbear from enforcing contractual remedies.3 1 In addition, borrowers
alleged other causes of action, such as fraud, misrepresentation,
duress, intentional interference, negligence, breach of fiduciary duties,
and breach of the duty of good faith.3 2 These new theories were widely
accepted by the courts because the courts were applying a new policy
to the lender-borrower relationship.Instead of viewing lenders and borrowers as dealing at arms'
length, the courts imposed on lenders a duty to exercise reasonable
care for the protection of the borrower.34 The increased litigation,
combined with the acceptance of numerous new theories of lender
liability, resulted in lenders having to spend much time and money in
6
court. 35 The banks passed these costs on to borrowers and depositors.

The legislature also recognized that a lender's relationship with a
borrower should be close, so that the lender could properly determine
the needs of the borrower and the soundness of the borrower's financial
plans.37 However, increased lender liability quelled lenders' efforts to

28. HOUSE IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 3, at 1. Deregulation allowed many S & Ls
to make loans which they were previously prohibited from making. Norton, supra note 27, at
1641. S & Ls are now permitted to make many different loans, such as (1) loans secured by
deposits and liens, (2) home improvement loans, (3) secured and unsecured consumer loans, (4)
educational loans, (5) unsecured construction loans, and (6) loans for commercial, corporate,
business or agricultural purposes. Id. at 1641-42.
29. See HOUSE IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 3, at 1. The legislative history to FLA.
STAT. § 687.0304 does not indicate why the increased competition between banks and the new
methods of financing encouraged litigation. See id. The increased litigation may have resulted

from the possibility that banks, facing stiff competition, more readily made oral representations
and commitments to borrowers to get more business. Borrowers sued when the lenders breached
these oral agreements. See Coffey, supra note 4, at 86.
30. Id.
31. Culhane & Gramlich, supra note 5, at 1779.
32. Coffey, supra note 4, at 99-121.
33. Id. at 103.
34. Id.
35. See Pearson, supra note 6, at 299-302.
36. Id.
37. HOUSE IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 3, at 1.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol44/iss5/3
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counsel borrowers and to help shape their financial plans. Lenders
often had given borrowers advice orally.3 However, because the courts
began to recognize lender liability claims based on oral representa41
tionso and because borrowers often misunderstood lenders' advice,
lenders started hesitating to give borrowers oral advice.4
Thus, 'to avoid misunderstandings, to facilitate open communications, and to improve... [the] certainty and stability.. ." in credit
transactions, the Florida Legislature passed Florida Statutes section
687.0304. 4 s For a borrower to maintain an action on a credit agreement,
the statute requires that the agreement be in writing, express consideration, set forth the relevant terms and conditions, and include the
signature of both the creditor and the debtor." The statute defines a
credit agreement as "an agreement to lend or forbear repayment of
money, goods, or things in action, to otherwise extend credit, or to
make any other financial accommodation." ' 45 The statute also explicitly
states that the following are considered credit agreements which must
be in writing for a borrower to maintain an action on them:
1. The rendering of financial advice by a creditor to a debtor;
2. The consultation by a creditor with a debtor; or
3. The agreement by a creditor to take certain actions, such
as entering into a new credit agreement, forbearing from
exercising remedies under prior credit agreements, or ex46
tending installments due under prior credit agreements.
The primary effect of the statute is the prevention of borrowers'
suits against lenders on credit agreements unless the agreements are
in writing. 47 Because the statute provides a broad definition of "credit
agreement," it allows lenders to render financial advice without incurring liability." Thus, the statute's primary purpose is to protect lenders

38. Id. at 2.
39. See id. at 1-2.
40. Culhane & Gramlich, supra note 5, at 1779.
41. HOUSE IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 3, at 2.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. FLA. STAT. § 687.0304(2) (1991).
45. Id. § 687.0304(1)(a).
46. Id. § 687.0304(3). Although the statute states that these actions are not considered
credit agreements, the statute actually treats the actions as if they were credit agreements and
requires that they be put in writing to be enforceable. Id.
47. Id. § 687.0304(2), (3).
48. HOUSE IMPACT STATEMENT, supm note 3, at 2.
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from debtors' claims that a lender had made an oral promise to lend
money or forbear on a debt. 49 In addition, the Florida Legislature and
the banking industry claim that the statute benefits debtors. By
requiring credit agreements to be in writing, the statute provides
"certainty to the terms of a credit transaction.'

5

Thus, "[t]he debtor

will know precisely where the lender stands regarding a loan transaction . . .52
In addition, the statute benefits the legal system. By requiring
that credit agreements be in writing, the statute reduces the number of
lender liability lawsuits because borrowers may no longer sue lenders
on oral credit agreements.- The statute also limits the number of
lender liability lawsuits by stating that a credit agreement may not
be implied from the relationship of the lender and borrower, "fiduciary,
or otherwise."'' Thus, borrowers may no longer allege causes of action
such as breach of fiduciary duty.5 The statute also may reduce the
cost of litigation.67 The statute relieves lenders from having to defend
against causes of action which are expensive to prove and disprove,
such as borrowers' attempts to prove the existence of oral and implied
commitments to lend money or forbear on debt. 5
III.

THE COURTS' RESPONSE TO THE STATUTE

Relatively few Florida courts have reviewed Florida Statutes section 687.0304. 59 Because the Florida statute is based on Minnesota
Statutes section 513.33, Minnesota cases should shed some light on how
Florida courts will address the issues raised by the statute.- Thus,

49. See id.
50. Id. at 3.
51. Id.
52. Id. However, the statute may actually have the opposite effect. The lender may be
able to make representations to a borrower and not put them in writing. The unwary borrower
may rely on these representations, and because the representations were oral, the borrower
may be unable to sue on them later. Thus, the statute might not help the borrower know
precisely where the lender stands. See infra notes 214-15 and accompanying text.
53. HOUSE IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 3, at 3.
54.

See id.

55. FLA. STAT. § 687.0304(3)(b) (1991).
56. See id.
57. HOUSE IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 3, at 3.
58. Id. However, the statute does not prevent lenders from maintaining actions on oral
credit agreements. FLA. STAT. § 687.0304 (1991). The statute only prevents borrowers from
doing so. Id.
59. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
60. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol44/iss5/3
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this section relies on both Florida and Minnesota case law to determine
how Florida courts will interpret section 687.0304. This section also
examines the extent to which the statute is likely to limit lender
liability. In particular, this section will address what constitutes a
credit agreement, the requirement of signatures, the ability of the
borrower to raise equitable defenses to the statute of frauds, the
ability of the borrower to allege fraud and misrepresentation, and the
ability of the borrower to sue in negligence.
A. What Constitutes a Credit Agreement
The Florida statute provides a very broad definition of "credit
agreement."' 61 The definition includes "agreements to lend or forbear,
agreements to extend credit, and agreements to make any other financial accommodation."6 The statute also protects creditors who orally
render financial advice or consult with debtors.63
Florida courts have yet to interpret this language. The only two
Florida cases which addressed section 687.0304 dealt with alleged
agreements which clearly fell within the statute. In Brenowitz v. Central National Bank,6 the Second District Court of Appeal dealt with
a note which represented an "agreement to lend" money, and thus
came under the statute. In Griffiths v. Barnett Bank,66 the same
came under
court held that an alleged oral agreement to lend money
''
the statute, because it was an "agreement to lend."
Minnesota courts, however, have dealt with the language in greater
depth and have generally found that any agreement which deals with
the financial aspects of a loan is considered a credit agreement. In
CapitalBank v. Sorenson,68 a Minnesota court held that an oral agreement to roll over notes was a credit agreement under Minnesota Statutes section 513.33. 69 In Sorenson, the lender and borrower had executed four promissory notes. 70 Because the borrower defaulted on the

61.

See supra text accompanying notes 44-46.

62. FLA. STAT. § 687.0304(1)(a) (1991); see supra note 21.
63. FLA. STAT. § 687.0304(3) (1991); see supra note 21.
64. 597 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992).
65. Id. at 341. However, the court held that the borrower could defend an action by the
creditor by alleging waiver, estoppel or bad faith arising out of an alleged oral credit agreement.
Id. at 343.
66. 603 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992).
67. Id. at 692.
68. No. C4-90-1122, 1990 WL 211991 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 24, 1990).
69. Id. at *2.
70. Id. at *1.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1992

9

Florida Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 5 [1992], Art. 3
816

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

notes, the bank attempted to foreclose the security interest it held in
the borrower's property. 71 The borrower alleged, however, that he
was not in default because the bank orally had agreed to roll over the
notes.72 The court held that the alleged oral agreement to roll over
the notes was a credit agreement.7 Because the agreement was not
in writing, the court held that Minnesota Statutes section 513.33 barred the borrower's allegation, and the court upheld the foreclosure.In Becker v. First American Bank, 5 the plaintiffs alleged that

their bank orally agreed to continue financing their business if the
business sold some of its assets. 76 The business sold some real estate

at less than market value, but two years later the bank refused to
continue loaning money to the business.Y The plaintiffs sued, seeking
damages from the "quick sale" of the property.78 The court held that
the agreement to continue financing constituted a credit agreement

under the Minnesota statute.7 9 Therefore, the court dismissed the suit
because it was based on a credit agreement which was not in writing.80
In Rural American Bank v. Herickhoff,s1 the Minnesota Supreme

Court held that an agreement to apply farm proceeds to one loan
before applying any of the proceeds to a second loan was a financial

accommodation and therefore a credit agreement subject to Minnesota
Statutes section 513.33.

2

In Herickhoff, the bank could not lend the

71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at *2. The court did not explain why an agreement to roll over notes is a credit
agreement. See id. However, an agreement to roll over notes could easily be considered a
financial accommodation, and thus, it would be a credit agreement under the statute. Cf. Rural
Am. Bank v. Herickhoff, 485 N.W.2d 702 (Minn. 1992) (holding that an agreement to apply
farm proceeds to a particular loan first was a credit agreement because it constituted a financial
accommodation).
74. Sorenson, 1990 WL 211991.
75. 420 N.W.2d 239 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
76. Id. at 239.
77. Id. at 239-40.
78. Id. at 240.
79. Id. The plaintiffs alleged that the damages arose from an oral agreement to continue
financing if certain assets were sold. Id. at 240. Because the agreement was not in writing, it
did not comply with § 513.33. Id. at 241. By advising the plaintiffs to sell some assets, the bank
could also be considered to have rendered financial advice. Id. Because "[Section] 513.33 specifically provides that rendering of financial advice by a creditor to a debtor does not give rise to
a claim that a new credit agreement is created unless such agreement is in writing," the plaintiffs'
action was precluded by the statute. Id. (alteration in original).
80. Id. at 240-41.
81. 485 N.W.2d 702 (Minn. 1992).
82. Id. at 706.
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borrower the money he needed for a farm loan. However, the borrower's father agreed to take out a loan for the balance of the sum
needed as long as the bank agreed to apply the proceeds from the
sale of crops to the father's loan first . 4 The court held that such an
agreement was a credit agreement because it constituted a financial
accommodation. The court indicated that because the agreement determined which loan would receive repayment priority, it was a financial accommodation with respect to a loan. Thus, the agreement fell
squarely within the legislature's intent to prevent borrowers from
maintaining actions on oral agreements concerning loans.1
In Carlson v. Estes,m a Minnesota court held that an agreement
to lower the interest rate on a loan was a credit agreement. The
court reasoned that by lowering the interest rate, the lender would
be forbearing repayment of money which the borrower owed the lender.9 Therefore, such an agreement fell within the statute and had
to be in writing to be enforceable. 91 However, the Carlson court also
held that an oral agreement not to record a mortgage did not constitute
a credit agreement and need not be in writing to be enforceable.9
The court reasoned that such a promise does not concern the actual
extension of credit or any financial accommodation.93 Therefore, the
court held that the agreement not to record a mortgage was not a
credit agreement under the statute.Y
As the Minnesota cases show, the statute's definition of a credit
agreement probably will be construed broadly by the Florida courts.
With the exception of agreements not to record mortgages, the Minnesota courts have held that all aspects of the lending process to which

83. Id. at 704.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 705-06.
86. Id. The court stated that the agreement could also be considered an agreement to
forbear repayment on the second loan. Id. Because agreements to forbear repayment are also
considered credit agreements under the statute, claims arising from a repayment priority agreement are barred by the statute unless the agreement is in writing. See id.
87. Id. at 705.
88. 458 N.W.2d 123 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
89. Id. at 128.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 127; see also Ingvalson v. Habberstad, No. C6-89-46, 1989 WL 84165 (Minn. Ct.
App. Aug. 1, 1989) (holding that an agreement not to record a mortgage did not constitute a
credit agreement).
93. Carlson, 458 N.W.2d at 127.
94. Id.
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the lender and borrower agree are considered credit agreements. 95
Specifically, the Minnesota courts have held that an agreement to roll
over a loan, an agreement to continue financing a business, a repayment priority agreement, and an agreement to lower the interest rate
on an existing loan all constitute credit agreements.9
The statutory definition of a credit agreement not only includes
agreements to lend money, but also includes agreements to forbear
repayment, to otherwise extend credit, or to make any other financial
accommodation.- The Minnesota courts have construed this language
liberally.9 The Carlson court held that an agreement to lower the
interest rate on a loan was an agreement to forbear repayment.9 The
Herickhoff court held that a repayment priority agreement was an
agreement to forbear repayment'0 as well as a financial accommodation.10, By so holding, the Herickhoffcourt implied that any agreement
which has an impact upon the financial aspects of a loan is a financial
accommodation.1- Thus, the Minnesota cases indicate that any agreement which has a direct impact on the financial aspects of a loan will
be considered a credit agreement.
B.

The Requirement of Signatures

Florida Statutes section 687.0304 requires that both the lender and
the borrower sign a credit agreement for the borrower to enforce the
agreement. 1°3 However, the statute fails to define what constitutes a
signature.- Often, loan commitments, loan applications, and other
credit agreements printed on bank stationery only contain the borrower's signature. 105 In Minnesota, borrowers have successfully argued
that an agreement on bank stationery should be considered "signed"
by the lender, even if it lacked the lender's manual signature.1°6 In

95. See supra notes 64-94 and accompanying text.
96. See supra notes 64-91 and accompanying text.
97.

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
drafted
only by
106.

FLA. STAT. § 687.0304 (1991); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 513.33 (West 1990).

See supra notes 68-96 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
See supra note 86.
See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text.
FLA. STAT. § 687.0304(2) (1991).
See id.
See, e.g., Herickhoff, 485 N.W.2d at 707 (examining a credit agreement which was
and typed by an officer of a bank on the bank's letterhead stationery, but was signed
the debtor's agent).
Id. at 707-08.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol44/iss5/3

12

Tochner: Limiting Lender Liability in Florida: The Application of a Statut
19921

LIMITING LENDER LIABILITY IN FLORIDA

Herickhoff, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that because a credit
agreement was on bank stationery and contained the borrower's signature, the agreement was "signed" for purposes of the statute. 1° The
Court applied the Minnesota U.C.C. definition of "signed" in making
its decision. 1' The U. C. C. provision reads: 'Signed' includes any symbol executed or adopted by a party with the present intention to
authenticate a writing."'1 9 The court concluded that by drafting a document on bank stationery, the bank intended to authenticate the document and thus, the bank should be bound by it.11o

It is uncertain whether Florida courts will follow Herickhoff. Minnesota Statutes section 513.33 was amended in 1991."' The amendment
states that under section 513.33, "'signed' has the meaning specified
in [the U.C.C.]." 2 Although Florida's U.C.C. contains the same definition for "signed" as Minnesota's U.C.C.,"1 Florida Statutes section

687.0304 does not incorporate the definition.14 Moreover, the Florida
Code Comments to the U.C.C. expressly note that, "'[sligned,' as here
defined, has no counterpart in prior Uniform Acts, and apparently
has not been similarly defined in other Florida statutes." ' 5 Therefore,
although Minnesota has adopted an expansive definition of "signed,"
Florida courts may very well choose to require an actual manual signature."1

C.

Defenses to the Statute of Frauds

Traditionally, courts have allowed claimants to raise equitable defenses to the statute of frauds."1 7 These defenses include equitable

107. Id.
108. Id. at 706.
109.

MINN. STAT. ANN. § 336.1-201.39 (West 1966).

110. Herickhoff, 485 N.W.2d at 707.
111. Id. at 706.
112.

Id.; see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 513.33(1)(4) (West Supp. 1993).

113. CompareMINN. STAT. ANN. § 336.1-201.39 (West 1966) with FLA. STAT. § 671.201(39)
(1991).
114. See FLA. STAT. § 687.0304 (1991); supra notes 21, 23. Arguably, the U.C.C. definition
of "signed" could apply if the credit agreement qualifies as a secured transaction and comes
under the control of Article Nine. See FLA. STAT. § 679.102 (1991).
115.

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 671.1-201 cmt. (39) (West 1966).

116. However, it must be noted that the Minnesota amendment defining "signed" was
declared by the Minnesota Legislature to be a clarification of its original intent. See Herickhoff,
485 N.W.2d at 707. One may be able to argue that the Florida Legislature, basing § 687.0304
on the Minnesota statute, adopted the definition of "signed" as the Minnesota Legislature intended.
117. See John H. Hickey, Credit Agreements Required in Writing: The New Statute of
Frauds, FLA. B.J., June 1990, at 69, 70.
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estoppel, partial performance, and waiver."1" In addition, parties have
alleged promissory estoppel"19 and prior course of dealing1' ° to circumvent the statute of frauds.1 2' All of these defenses attempt to circumvent
the statute of frauds by introducing evidence of oral representations
and conduct. 1' Borrowers have used the doctrines both defensively,
to defend against an action by a creditor,'2 and offensively, to assert
a cause of action which would otherwise be barred by the statute of
frauds.12 This section of the note examines whether, and to what
extent, a borrower may assert these defenses for both offensive and
defensive purposes in Florida.
1. Used Offensively
Florida case law suggests that a borrower will probably not be
able to use the affirmative defenses to the statute of frauds in order
to maintain an action or to assert a counterclaim. 12 In Brenowitz v.
CentralNational Bank, 2 6 the Second District Court of Appeal stated,

in dicta, that a borrower could not maintain an action on an alleged
oral credit agreement barred by section 687.0304 by asserting defenses

such as waiver, estoppel, and bad faith.'2 The court held that a borrower may be able to use these doctrines defensively.'2 However, the

court added that a borrower who used these doctrines offensively

118. See id. These defenses are equitable doctrines. Id. They apply when a person acts or
makes representations which would lead one to conclude that the agreement was modified. Id.
That person is estopped from claiming that the modification is barred by the statute of frauds
or is deemed to have waived the right to sue on the agreement. Id.
119. See, e.g., Norwest Bank Minn. v. Midwestern Mach. Co., 481 N.W.2d 875 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1992) (allowing a defendant's counterclaim based on promissory estoppel to bring the
contract out of the statute of frauds).
120. See, e.g., Fronning v. Blume, 429 N.W.2d 310 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (disallowing a
borrower's allegation of prior course of dealing because it directly conflicted with the terms of
the agreement).
121. See supra notes 119-20.
122. See supra notes 118-20.
123. See, e.g., Brenowitz v. Central Nat'l Bank, 597 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992) (holding
that a borrower could avoid the operation of FLA. STAT. § 687.0304 in an action by a creditor
by alleging the affirmative defenses of waiver, estoppel, and bad faith).
124. See, e.g., Norwest Bank Minn., 481 N.W.2d 875 (allowing a borrower to avoid the
application of MINN. STAT. § 513.33 by alleging promissory estoppel, and thereby bring suit
against the lender).
125. See Brenowitz, 597 So. 2d at 343.
126. 597 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992).
127. Id. at 343.
128. Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol44/iss5/3

14

Tochner: Limiting Lender Liability in Florida: The Application of a Statut
LIMITING LENDER LIABILITY IN FLORIDA

would actually be maintaining an action on a credit agreement which
was not in writing.12 The court stated that section 687.0304 expressly
prohibited such an action. 130
Other Florida case law dealing with the statute of frauds supports
the dicta in Brenowitz. Generally, courts have held that the affirmative
defenses are available only in equity, to prevent the other party from
unjustly claiming rights under an agreement. 131 However, these equitable defenses may not be used to maintain an action at law for damages.'2 Applying this to section 687.0304, a borrower would be allowed
to use the affirmative defenses in defending a suit brought by a lender.133 In such a suit, a borrower could use the affirmative defenses
to estop a lender from relying on the statute of frauds to nullify oral
representations that the lender made to the borrower.' However, a
borrower would be unable to use the affirmative defenses offensively,
because by so doing, the borrower would actually be using the defenses
to maintain an action at law.'1 Because the dicta in Brenowitz is
supported by other Florida case law, it is unlikely that a borrower
will be able to use these defenses to maintain an action which is barred
by section 687.0304.
2. Used Defensively
Case law suggests that borrowers may assert these statute of
frauds defenses in a creditor's action brought in a Florida court. However, the borrower's use of these defenses may be extremely limited.
For example, in Brenowitz, the Second District Court of Appeal held
that a borrower may assert affirmative defenses such as waiver, estoppel, and bad faith to avoid section 687.0304 in an action brought by
a creditor.' In Brenowitz, the bank filed suit after the borrower failed

129. Id.

130. Id.
131. See, e.g., United of Omaha Life Ins. Co. v. Nob Hill Assocs., 450 So. 2d 536 (3d DOA)
(allowing estoppel as a defense where a party detrimentally relied on the promise of another),
rev. denied, 458 So. 2d 274 (Fla. 1984).
132. See, e.g., Tanenbaum v. Biscayne Osteopathic Hosp., 190 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 1966) (rejecting the use of promissory estoppel as an offensive method of avoiding the statute of frauds);
Elsberry v. Sexton, 54 So. 592 (Fla. 1911) (rejecting the use of the part performance doctrine
as an offensive method of avoiding the statute of frauds); Williams v. Faile, 118 So. 2d 599
(Fla. 1st DCA 1960) (holding that no action at law could be maintained on an oral contract,
even where part performance had occurred).
133. See, e.g., Nob Hill Assocs., 450 So. 2d at 536.
134. See, e.g., id.
135. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 132.
136. Brenowitz, 597 So. 2d at 343.
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to make several payments on a loan agreement and after the bank
demanded acceleration under the provisions of the agreement. 1" The
borrower asserted several affirmative defenses. 13 In support of these
defenses, the borrower claimed that the bank officials had met with
him and stated, among other things, that if the borrower brought his
interest payments up to date, the bank would withdraw its demand
for acceleration. 13 9 Subsequently, the borrower brought his interest
payments up to date, but the bank still maintained its demand for
acceleration. 140 The bank did not deny that such discussions took
place. 14 1 Rather, the bank argued that the borrower could not defend
on the basis of an oral credit agreement because such defenses are
barred by section 687.0304.142
The Brenowitz court held that section 687.0304 did not bar the
defenses.'4 The court reasoned that the statute only bars borrowers
from maintaining actions on credit agreements that are not in writing.1 In Brenowitz, the borrower was not maintaining an action, but
rather defending an action. 14 Because the statute did not expressly
apply to defenses, the court held that the affirmative defenses to the
statute of frauds are preserved under section 687.0304.146
Although the Brenowitz court would allow a borrower to defend
an action by a creditor based on equitable defenses to the statute of
frauds, the court did not address whether a borrower could use promissory estoppel or prior course of dealing as a defense. 147 No Florida
cases have addressed whether a borrower may use promissory estoppel
or prior course of dealing as a defense to section 687.0304. However,
one Minnesota case allowed a borrower to assert a counterclaim based
on promissory estoppel. 148 In Norwest Bank Minnesota v. Midwestern
Machinery Co., 149 a Minnesota court held that Minnesota Statutes
section 513.33 did not prevent a borrower from asserting a counterclaim based on an oral agreement.1 50 The court held that the bor137.
138.

Id. at 341.
Id. The defenses were waiver, estoppel, and bad faith. Id.

139. Id.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See
481
Id.
Id.

at 343.

id.
N.W.2d 875 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
at 880.
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rower could use promissory estoppel to avoid the operation of the
statute.151
It is unlikely, however, that Florida courts will follow this case
and allow promissory estoppel to be a defense to Florida Statutes
section 687.0304. In Florida, there are a number of cases which state
that promissory estoppel may not be used to avoid the statute of
frauds because the use of promissory estoppel would violate the policy
of imposing liability only on written agreements. 152 Because Florida
courts have universally held that promissory estoppel may not be used
to circumvent the statute of frauds, the courts will probably prevent
borrowers from using promissory estoppel as a defense to section
687.0304.
No Florida court has decided whether a borrower may use prior
course of dealing to circumvent section 687.0304. However, a Minnesota court addressed prior course of dealing in Fronningv. Blume.1In Fronning, the borrower had purchased a farm after obtaining
financing from a bank.'r The bank obtained a security interest in the
borrower's farm machinery255 The borrower also financed his farm
operations with the bank, and his debt steadily grew. 156 The bank
became concerned with the size of the borrower's debt, and a loan
officer suggested that the borrower might need to sell some assets to
obtain further financing257 Under a new financing agreement which
extended the borrower's line of credit, the bank had the discretion
not to fund any future loans.'m However, the borrower asserted that
under the prior course of dealing between the bank and the borrower,
the bank had funded all loans and therefore should be required to
fund all future loans.'5 9 The court held that prior course of dealing
could be used to interpret terms of the agreement, but not to contradict

151. Id.
152. See, e.g., Tanenbaum, 190 So. 2d at 777; Coral Way Properties, Ltd. v. Roses, 565
So. 2d 372 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (finding that the use of promissory estoppel to uphold an oral
subleasing agreement would defeat the purpose of the statute of frauds); Florida Power & Light
Co. v. American Ltd., 511 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987) (reversing the trial court's decision
that promissory estoppel provides an exception to the statute of frauds); Rowland v. Ewell,
174 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965) (explaining that the part performance doctrine did not immunize
oral wage agreements from the statute of frauds).
153. 429 N.W.2d 310 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
154. Id. at 311.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 314.
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them.1 -6 Thus, although prior course of dealing could be taken into
account, the financing agreement explicitly stated that the bank was
not required to fund any loans,161 and prior course of dealing could
not be used to contradict the express terms of the agreement.In Fronning, the Minnesota court stated that prior course of dealing could be used to interpret a credit agreement. 163 However, Florida
courts may choose not to follow Fronning.First, prior course of dealing is a creature of the U.C.C.,'6 and the U.C.C. does not necessarily
apply to all credit agreements.'6 In Fronning, the credit agreement
was also a secured transaction,16 and Article Nine of the U.C.C.
applies to secured transactions.167 However, not all credit agreements
are secured transactions. 16 Moreover, section 687.0304 may be interpreted to disallow the use of prior course of dealing even for secured
credit agreements. 169 Section 687.0304(3)(b) expressly provides that "a
credit agreement may not be implied from the relationship, fiduciary,
or otherwise, of the creditor and the debtor."'7 By looking at the
prior course of dealing between a borrower and lender, a court would
be looking at the past relationship between the parties, because the
prior course of dealing between parties represents the relationship
that had developed between those parties.17 Thus, by taking into
account prior course of dealing, a court may arguably be implying a
credit agreement from the relationship between the creditor and the
debtor. Based on this interpretation, a court could hold that the doctrine of prior course of dealing is entirely prohibited by section
687.0304.172

160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. See FLA. STAT. § 671.205 (1991).
165. See FLA. STAT. §§ 672.102, 673.102, 674.102, 675.102, 676.102, 679.102, 680.1021 (1991).
The Uniform Commercial Code applies to agreements which involve transactions in goods, leases,
negotiable instruments, funds transfers, letters of credit, bulk sales, and secured transactions,
but not to credit agreements. Id.
166. See Fronning,429 N.W.2d at 311.
167. See FLA. STAT. § 679.102 (1991).
168. For example, a credit agreement under which no security is posted does not come
under Article Nine. See id. §§ 671.201(37), 679.102.
169. Id. § 687.0304.
170. Id. § 687.0304(b)(3).
171. See, e.g., id. § 671.205.
172. See id. § 687.0304(b)(3).
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Even if the Florida courts were to allow borrowers to allege prior
course of dealing as a defense, the defense would probably be of limited
value. As in Fronning,Florida courts have held that courts may only
examine prior course of dealing to interpret an agreement, not to
contradict an existing agreement or to create a new one. 173 Therefore,
if the credit agreement contradicts the prior course of dealing, the
borrower may not use prior course of dealing as a defense. 174
In summary, a borrower probably will not be able to use equitable
defenses to the statute of frauds to maintain an action.y 5 However,
courts generally permit borrowers to use these defenses to defend
against actions by a creditors. 76 Promissory estoppel probably will
not be available to borrowers who wish to circumvent section 687.0304.
Moreover, it is questionable whether Florida courts will allow borrowers to use prior course of dealing as a defense to section 687.0304.
Finally, even if available, prior course of dealing is of limited use to
borrowers, because borrowers cannot introduce prior course of dealing
to contradict the terms of a written agreement.' 77
D.

Fraud and Misrepresentation

Borrowers often allege fraud or misrepresentation to circumvent
the statute of frauds. 78 Borrowers have alleged fraud both defensively
179
in a suit on a contract, as well as offensively as an independent tort.
For example, in Griffiths v. BarnettBank,180 the Second District Court
of Appeal disallowed a borrower's claim for fraud because section
687.0304 barred such a claim.' 8' In that case, a bank brought a foreclosure action against the borrower. The borrower counterclaimed,
asserting negligence, indemnification, breach of contract, breach of
fiduciary relationship, and fraud. 2 The court held that section 687.0304

173.

See, e.g., Flagship Natl Bank v. Gray Distribution Sys., 485 So. 2d 1336, 1340-41

(Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (holding that where prior course of dealing and express terms of an agreement
are inconsistent, the express terms of the agreement control).
174. Id.
175. See supra notes 132-35 and accompanying text.
176. See supm notes 136-46 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 152-62, 173-74 and accompanying text.
178. See, e.g., Griffiths v. Barnett Bank, 603 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); Capital Bank
v. Sorenson, No. C4-90-1122, 1990 WL 211991 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 24, 1990); Norwest Bank
Montevideo v. General Dryer Corp., No. C4-89-1986, 1990 WL 48553 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 24,
1990); Fronning v. Blume, 429 N.W.2d 310 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
179. See Pearson, supra note 6, at 314-15.
180. 603 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 691.
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barred the borrower's counterclaim and dismissed it. 13 The court
reasoned that the counterclaim was founded on the borrower's assertion that the bank made oral statements or agreements regarding the
extension of credit.18 4 The court reiterated its holding in Brenowitz,
stating that to allow the borrower to assert a claim based on oral
representations would violate section 687.0304.13 The court stated,
however, that a borrower would not be precluded from raising fraud
as an affirmative defense because section 687.0304 does not bar such
a defense. 18
Although no other Florida court has addressed fraud claims with
respect to section 687.0304, many Florida courts have analyzed
whether a party may use a fraud claim to circumvent the statute of
frauds.' 8 The courts have generally held that a party may not use a
claim of fraud or misrepresentation to circumvent the statute of frauds
because the purpose of the statute of frauds is to prevent such claims.'8
Notwithstanding these cases, the legislative history of section
687.0304 explicitly states that the Florida Legislature did not intend
to eliminate all lender liability suits by enacting section 687.0304.189
According to the legislative history, causes of action such as fraud are
still available.- ° Therefore, the Griffiths holding, by barring causes of
action based on fraud, directly conflicts with the legislative history of
section 687.0304.191 Thus, although Florida's Second District Court of

183. Id. at 692.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 691-92.
186. Id.
187. See, e.g., Canell v. Arcola Hous. Corp., 65 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 1953) (holding that a claim
of fraud based on an oral promise could not be used to circumvent the statute of frauds in a
contract for purchase of land); Khawly v. Reboul, 488 So. 2d 856 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (holding
that an action for fraud in the inducement of an oral contract to form a business was barred
by the statute of frauds, where performance of the contract was to continue for more than one
year); Ostman v. Lawn, 305 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974) (holding that the statute of frauds
precluded an action for fraud based on the breach of an employment contract which was not in
writing and was for a period of more than one year); Ashland Oil v. Pickard, 269 So. 2d 714
(3d DCA 1972) (noting that statute of frauds cannot be avoided by fraud claim based on oral
representations, but finding a sufficient written agreement existed), cert. denied, 285 So. 2d 18
(Fla. 1973).
188. See, e.g., Canell, 65 So. 2d at 849.
189. SENATE IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 22, at 2.
190. Id.
191. Compare Griffiths, 603 So. 2d at 690 (holding that a claim based on fraud was barred
by FLA. STAT. § 687.0304 because it was founded on oral assertions made by the bank) with
SENATE IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 22, at 2 (stating that the statute would not eliminate
all lender liability lawsuits, particularly those based on fraud).
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Appeal currently disallows fraud claims while still allowing fraud to
be alleged as an affirmative defense, 19 other Florida courts may choose
to follow the legislative history of section 687.0304 and allow offensive
fraud claims as well.
However, even if Florida courts allow a borrower to utilize fraud
either as a claim or defense, such use will be limited. To allege fraud
successfully, a person must act in justifiable reliance on the fraud or
misrepresentation. 1 Reliance is never justified when the representa-

tion contradicts provisions in a written agreement.'9 A Minnesota
court, although holding that a borrower could assert a counterclaim
for fraud under Minnesota Statutes section 513.33, also held that the
claim failed because the borrower unjustifiably relied on an oral representation which directly conflicted with the terms of the written
credit agreement. 95 Federal courts sitting in Florida have used the
same reasoning.'9 Therefore, in applying fraud to section 687.0304,
Florida courts are likely to limit fraud claims in the same fashion.
E.

Negligence Claims

Borrowers have attempted to avoid the operation of Florida Statutes section 687.0304 by suing in negligence.' " Florida courts, while

generally holding that contract claims do not give rise to tort liability, 198
nevertheless have recognized a cause of action for the negligent performance of a contractual duty.'9 However, Florida courts have yet
192. See supra notes 180-86 and accompanying text.
193. See, e.g., Lance v. Wade, 457 So. 2d 1008, 1011 (Fla. 1984) (noting that a class action
fraud suit was inappropriate where some class members did not actually rely on the alleged
misrepresentation).
194. See, e.g., First Union Discount Brokerage Servs. v. Milos, 744 F. Supp. 1145, 1156
(S.D. Fla. 1990); Capital Bank v. Sorenson, No. C4-90-1122, 1990 WL 211991, at *2 (Minn. Ct.
App. Dec. 24, 1990).
195. Sorenson, 1990 WL 211991 at *2.
196. Milos, 744 F. Supp. at 1156.
197. See Griffiths, 603 So. 2d at 690.
198. See, e.g., American Int'l Land Corp. v. Hanna, 323 So. 2d 567, 569 (Fla. 1976); Douglas
v. Braman Porche Audi, Inc., 451 So. 2d 1038, 1039 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). A mere breach of
contract does not give rise to tort liability. Electronic Sec. Sys. Corp. v. Southern Bell Tel. &
Tel. Co., 482 So. 2d 518, 519 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). Only when a breach of contract is accompanied
by additional conduct which supports an independent tort claim, may a breach of contract also
constitute negligence. Id.
199. See, e.g., Thomas v. Estate of Parras, 562 So. 2d 786 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (defendant
negligently performed an aviation contract); First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. First Title Serv. Co.,
457 So. 2d 467 (Fla. 1984) (defendant negligently performed a contract to examine title); Hanft
v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 402 So. 2d 453 (3d DCA 1981) (defendant negligently performed
a contractual duty to list plaintiff in the phone book), modified on other grounds, 436 So. 2d
40 (Fla. 1983).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1992

21

Florida Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 5 [1992], Art. 3
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

to allow a claim for the negligent performance of a credit agreement,2
although at least one other state recognizes such a cause of action.,-1
In Maryland, a state court of appeals upheld a cause of action for
negligent processing of a loan application.m However, in Griffiths,
the Florida Second District Court of Appeal dismissed a cause of action
for negligence, because the claim arose out of an alleged oral credit
agreement, and section 687.0304 barred such a claim.2 Unless these
new negligence theories develop further in Florida, Griffiths will still
apply, and section 687.0304 will bar such negligence claims because
they are based on credit agreements which are not in writing.
IV.

PROBLEMS WITH FLORIDA STATUTES SECTION

687.0304

According to the legislative history of section 687.0304, the statute
was passed to protect lenders from the rising number of lender liability
lawsuits based on alleged oral credit agreements. The statute has
achieved this by severely restricting borrowers' ability to sue creditors. 205 Although Florida courts have preserved the affirmative defenses to the statute of frauds, 206 the courts have precluded borrowers
from using these doctrines to sue creditors.207 Thus, a borrower may
be able to use the doctrines of equitable estoppel, part performance
and waiver to defend against an action by a creditor.m However,
section 687.0304 prevents a borrower from using these doctrines to
sue a creditor.2°9 In addition, the statute prevents a borrower from
using other causes of action to sue a lender. Although a borrower
21
may use fraud and misrepresentation to defend against a creditor, 0
a borrower cannot sue a lender for fraud or misrepresentation arising
212
out of an oral credit agreement. 211 Alleging prior course of dealing
or negligence 213 will probably be equally unfruitful.
200. See Griffiths, 603 So. 2d at 691-92 (disallowing a counterclaim for negligence because
the claim was based on an alleged oral credit agreement).
201. See Jacques v. First Nat'l Bank, 515 A.2d 756 (Md. Ct. App. 1986).
202. Id. However, Colorado has specifically not recognized such a cause of action. Centennial
Square, Ltd. v. Resolution Trust Co., 815 P.2d 1002 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991).
203. Griffiths, 603 So. 2d at 691-92.
204.

ing text.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

HOUSE IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 3, at 2; see supra notes 26-47 and accompany-

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

supra notes
supra notes
supra notes
supra notes
supra notes
supra notes
supra notes
supra notes
supra notes

117-35, 178-95 and accompanying text.
136-46 and accompanying text.
125-35 and accompanying text.
136-46 and accompanying text.
125-35 and accompanying text.
178-96 and accompanying text.
178-96 and accompanying text.
153-74 and accompanying text.
197-203 and accompanying text.
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The legislative history of section 687.0304 suggests that the statute
will benefit borrowers by "giving certainty to the terms of a credit
transaction. The debtor will know precisely where the lender stands
regarding a loan transaction because [the terms] will be required to
be reduced to writing. 214 However, the statute may have the opposite
effect. Many borrowers, particularly uncounseled consumer borrowers,
may not know of the writing requirement in section 687.0304. Because
they are unaware that section 687.0304 requires credit agreements to
be in writing, these borrowers may rely on lenders' unwritten representations and subsequently be unable to enforce them. 215 Thus, this
statute may put the unwary borrower at a distinct disadvantage.
By precluding borrowers from using many of the new lender liability theories which the courts developed in the 1980s, section 687.0304
2 16
undermines the lender liability policy which the courts developed.
During the 1980s, the courts created new theories of lender liability
to impose upon lenders a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect
borrowers.2 17 However, section 687.0304 presupposes that borrowers
and lenders operate at arms' length and therefore eliminates the protection which borrowers had gained from the courts.218 Perhaps commercial borrowers operate at arms' length from lenders and need not
be protected. However, consumer borrowers are rarely represented
by counsel, often rely on oral representations of the lender, and trust
a lender's financial expertise when obtaining financing. 2 9 Thus, it is
improbable that consumer borrowers deal at arms' length with lenders,
and they may require the protection which the new lender liability
theories had afforded them. However, because section 687.0304 does
not distinguish between commercial and consumer credit agreements,
consumer borrowers have lost the protection they had gained from
the courts during the 1980s.m°

214.

HOUSE IMPACT STATEMENT, supranote 3, at 3; see supranotes 50-52 and accompany-

ing text.
215. The borrower is precluded by FLA. STAT. § 687.0304 from maintaining an action on
an oral representation and is also precluded from using affirmative defenses, such as equitable
estoppel, part performance, and waiver, to maintain an action to enforce the oral representations.

See supra notes 206-09 and accompanying text. In addition a borrower may not use fraud,
misrepresentation, prior course of dealing, or negligence to maintain an action to enforce the oral
representations. See supra notes 210-13 and accompanying text.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

See
Id.
See
See
See

Coffey, supra note 4, at 103.
id.
HOUSE IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 3, at 1-2.
FLA. STAT. § 687.0304(1)(c) (1991) ("DTebtor' means a person who obtains credit

or seeks a credit agreement with a creditor or who owes money to a creditor.").
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Section 687.0304 contains another inherent inequity. By providing
that "[a] debtor may not maintain an action on a credit agreement
unless the agreement is in writing," section 687.0304 prevents borrowers from suing lenders on oral credit agreements, but does not prevent
lenders from suing borrowers on such agreements. =1 Although the
primary purpose of the statute is to protect creditors from the increasing effects of lender liability, 2 it is inequitable to apply the limitations
of the statute against borrowers but not lenders.V.

IMPROVING FLORIDA STATUTES SECTION

687.0304

Florida Statutes section 687.0304 contains two major problems.
First, the statute severely restricts borrowers' ability to sue lenders,
which primarily hurts the unwary consumer borrower.22 Second, the
statute is inequitable, because it prevents only borrowers from suing
lenders on oral credit agreements, without similarly preventing lenders
from suing borrowers.2
By preventing borrowers from suing lenders on credit agreements
which are not in writing, the statute precludes borrowers from using
many of the lender liability theories which the courts developed during
the 1980s to protect borrowers.- Commercial borrowers may still be
able to protect themselves because they have greater bargaining
power, will probably know of the effects of the statute, and are usually
represented by counsel. However, consumer borrowers probably will
not be able to protect themselves, because they may not know of the
statute, and are rarely represented by counsel.
Other states have taken steps to protect the consumer borrower
while still reducing the potential liability of lenders. 7 These states
have exempted consumer transactions from their statutes.M By
exempting consumer transactions, these statutes still achieve their
purpose because lenders are protected from liability in commercial
transactions, where the dollar value of the transaction, and hence
potential liability, is greatest.2 These statutes acknowledge the differ221. See id. § 687.0304(2).
222. HOUSE IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 3, at 1-3.
223. See Culhane & Gramlich, supra note 5, at 1794.
224. See supra notes 205-13, 216-20 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 221-23 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 4, 30-34, 205-13 and accompanying text.
227. See infra notes 232-40 and accompanying text.
228. See infra note 232 and accompanying text.
229. For a brief description of some of the larger lender liability judgments based on oral
contracts given to commercial borrowers, see Culhane & Gramlich, supra note 5, at 1785; see
also Loeb H. Granoff, Emerging Theories of Lender Liability: Flawed Applications of Old
Concepts, 104 BANKING L.J. 492 (1987).
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ences between commercial and consumer borrowers. Commercial borrowers, .who routinely are represented by counsel, are more likely to
be aware of the statute and protect themselves accordingly. However,
consumer transactions are exempted from these statutes -in order to
protect the unwary borrower.m Still, because the dollar amounts involved in consumer transactions are small, 231 the potential liability of
lenders does not increase in proportion to the number of oral agreements protected.
A number of states have taken several different steps to exempt
the consumer borrower from the effects of the statute. For example,
in some states, credit agreements for personal, family or household
purposes are exempted from the operation of the statute.23 Other
states protect the consumer borrower by putting a floor on the dollar
value of the agreements which are covered by the statute. 233 By
exempting small loans, or loans for personal, family or household purposes, the legislatures of these states protect consumer borrowers
because consumer borrowers are most likely to be taking out such
loans.2
Many other states use another method to protect consumer borrowers.23 These states require the lender to provide the borrower with

230. Pearson, supra note 6, at 306.
231. The statute can control the dollar amount up to which credit transactions are exempt.
See infra note 233 and accompanying text.
232. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.010(a)(13) (Michie Supp. 1992); ARiz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 44-101(9) (West Supp. 1992); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1624(g) (West Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE
7101(1) (Smith-Hurd
ANN. tit. 6, § 2714(b) (Michie Supp. 1992); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 17,
Supp. 1992); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-6-5 (Michie 1991); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.36.120
(West Supp. 1993). Missouri enacted a limited exemption for consumer borrowers. See Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 432.045(3)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1993). Missouri exempts "credit agreements for
personal, family or household purposes" only when "the debtor and creditor orally agree to
defer one or more loan payments or make other credit agreement modifications and such deferrals
or modifications are limited in duration to not more than ninety days." Id.
233. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.010(a)(13) (Michie Supp. 1992) (exempting all transactions
under $50,000 from the operation of the statute); ARK- CODE ANN. § 4-59-101(d) (Michie 1991)
(exempting transactions under $10,000); ALz.REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-101(9) (West Supp. 1992)
(exempting transactions under $250,000); CAL. CIw. CODE § 1624(g) (West Supp. 1993) (exempting transactions under $100,000); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-10-124(2) (West 1990) (exempting
transactions under $25,000); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-6-5(B) (Michie 1991) (exempting transactions
under $25,000); TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.02(b) (West Supp. 1993) (exempting transactions under $50,000).
234. See Pearson, supra note 6, at 306.
235. See Culhane & Gramlich, supm note 5, at 1789-80; Pearson, supra note 6, at 305-06.
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notice of the statute. 236 Kansas requires that the lender put the notice
within the credit agreement.3 7 Texas requires that the lender give
notice to the borrower in a separate document which accompanies the
credit agreement.- Texas also requires lenders to conspicuously post
a notice in their offices which informs borrowers of the statute. 2 9 By
requiring lenders to provide borrowers notice of the statute, these
states protect consumer borrowers, who would probably not otherwise
know of the effects of the statute.?4°
Because Florida does not exempt consumer transactions from the
effect of section 687.0304 and does not require lenders to provide
notice of the statute to borrowers, consumer borrowers remain unprotected in Florida.-' If Florida exempted consumer transactions from
the statute, consumer borrowers would be able to use the new lender
liability theories which the courts created for the protection of borrowers in the 1980s.2 Even if consumer transactions were exempted,
section 687.0304 would still protect lenders from increased lender liability because the statute would prevent commercial borrowers from
suing on oral credit agreements. In addition, if Florida required that
lenders provide borrowers with notice of the statute, consumer borrowers, who might not otherwise know of the statute, would be warned
of its effects. 2The other major problem with Florida Statutes section 687.0304
is that it protects only lenders from borrowers' suits on oral credit
agreements, but does not similarly protect borrowers from lenders'
suits. 2A The Joint Task Force of the Committees on Consumer and
Commercial Financial Services, after studying many states' statutes
of frauds on credit agreements,? 5 recommended a statute which applied

236. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 535.17(2) (West Supp. 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
16-118(b) (1988 & Supp. 1992); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 432.045(3) (Vernon Supp. 1993); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 45-1, 113(2)(c) (Supp. 1992); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-6-5(B) (Michie 1991); OR. REV.
STAT. § 41.580(3) (1991); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 26.02(e), (f), (g) (West Supp. 1993);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.36.130 to .140 (West Supp. 1993).
237. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16-118(b) (1988 & Supp. 1992).
238. See TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §8 26.02(e), (f), (g) (West Supp. 1993).
239. See id.
240. See Pearson, supra note 6, at 305-06.
241. See supra notes 224-40 and accompanying text.
242. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
243. See Pearson, supra note 6, at 305-06.
244. See supra notes 221-23 and accompanying text.
245. Culhane & Gramlich, supra note 5, at 1780.
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to both lenders and borrowers. 2 6The task force believed that a lenderoriented statute such as section 687.0304 would be inequitable, because
it would protect lenders but not borrowers. 247 Thus, to make section
687.0304 more equitable, the legislature should amend the statute and
apply its litigation restrictions to both lenders and borrowers.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Florida Statutes section 687.0304 is a lender oriented statute.m
Although it benefits lenders by reducing their liability exposure 249 and
benefits the legal system by reducing the number of lawsuits brought
on credit agreements,m the benefits to borrowers are illusory. Consumer borrowers will primarily feel the statute's adverse effects because they are unaware of the statute's ranifications.m21 With a few
amendments, such as provisions for notice, exemptions for consumer
borrowers, and the application of the statute to both lenders and
borrowers, Florida Statutes section 687.0304 could much more equitably achieve its purpose.
Jeffrey A. Tochner

246. Id. at 1794.
247. See id.
248. For example, the statute only prevents borrowers from suing lenders on oral credit
agreements. FLA. STAT. § 687.0304(2) (1991). It still allows lenders to sue borrowers on such
agreements. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 221-23.
249. See supra notes 204-13 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 240-42 and accompanying text.
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